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Abstract
The Carter Administration came to office intent on changing the traditional logic of US fo-
reign policy, namely by promoting a foreign policy set in a framework based on human rights. 
The Administration sought to make human rights a central tenet of US foreign policy while 
simultaneously protecting American national interests abroad. However, since early on, critics 
have considered the Administration’s policy to be inconsistent and indecisive due to its failure 
to grasp the complexity of balancing many inherently conflicting issues. This paper analyses the 
Carter Administration’s human rights policy throughout its term in office. It demonstrates how 
the Administration acknowledged the difficulty in reconciling moral and material issues in the 
development of its foreign policy. In addition, the paper considers how US human rights policy 
has informed foreign policy in subsequent Administrations. It highlights the continuous dyna-
mics contributing to the inconsistencies verified between foreign policy discourse and behaviour.
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Resumen
La Administración Carter llegó al Gobierno con la intención de cambiar la lógica tradicional 
de la política exterior de los EE.UU., a saber mediante la promoción de una política exterior 
situada en un marco basado en los derechos humanos. El gobierno trató de hacer de los derechos 
humanos un elemento central de la política exterior de los EE.UU. al mismo tiempo buscando 
proteger los intereses nacionales de los Estados Unidos en el extranjero. Sin embargo, desde el 
principio, los críticos han considerado que la política de la Administración era incongruente e 
fluctuante debido a su incapacidad de comprender la complejidad en equilibrar muchas cuestio-
nes inherentemente contradictorias. En este trabajo se analiza la política de derechos humanos 
del gobierno de Carter. Demuestra cómo la Administración reconoció la dificultad de conciliar 
las cuestiones morales y materiales en el desarrollo de su política exterior. Además, considera 
cómo la política de derechos humanos de los EE.UU. ha informado a la política exterior de los 
gobiernos posteriores. Se destaca la dinámica continua contribuyendo para las inconsistencias 
verificadas entre el discurso y el comportamiento de la política exterior.
Palabras clave: Administración Carter, derechos humanos, interés nacional, política exterior de EE.UU.
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1. Introduction1
Today it seems difficult for us to appreciate US foreign policy without taking into 
consideration its human rights dimension. It has served as a distinctive feature of «US 
self-image» in foreign policy (Mertus, 2004: 23) and as a standard for evaluating each 
Administration’s performance in the international arena. However, only a short four deca-
des ago human rights were not much more than a peripheral objective within the overall 
context of US foreign policy (Buckley, 1980).
While there was some initial congressional bustle in the early 1970s, it was the Carter 
presidency that «opened the way for the astonishing explosion of ‘human rights’ across 
the American political landscape» (Moyn, 2010: 154). However, while human rights 
acquired an added significance with the Carter Administration, and have since become a 
standard for evaluating US foreign policy, it also initiated a trend of inconsistencies and 
contradictions that stretch up to the present moment.
Beginning with the Carter presidency, all the US Administrations have had difficulty 
in achieving a balanced trade-off among the main components of the national interest: 
ideals, prosperity, and national security. More often than not, strategic and economic 
considerations have prevailed over other interests, particularly those of a moral proclivity. 
While the US has been extremely vocal on human rights issues over the last three decades, 
this rhetoric has usually not been vindicated by its foreign policy record.
The Carter Administration faced this challenge early on. It developed a broad concept 
of human rights and made them a central tenet of US foreign policy. However, it also 
acknowledged that other issues of national interest would many times prevail over human 
rights considerations. In this sense, the Carter Administration committed itself to a mo-
rally pragmatic foreign policy which tried to properly balance the diverse issues involved 
in promoting the national interest.
2. Human Rights in US Foreign Policy before the Carter Administration
The issues intrinsic to human rights have traditionally informed US foreign policy. The 
Declaration of Independence’s universalist ideology has fed the American belief of its 
altruistic conduct on behalf of «humanity» and «civilization» (Kagan, 2006). However, 
regardless of rhetorical considerations, before the Carter Administration came to office 
human rights policy were barely institutionalised and broadly defined in terms of foreign 
policy (Hartmann, 2001). In the early post-war years the US actively supported the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the references to human rights in the United 
Nations Charter. However, decision-makers endeavoured to curtail the establishment of 
any precise and binding obligations regarding human rights (Forsythe, 1990). The 1950s 
witnessed a mounting disregard for human rights which extended for over two decades. 
1. The current paper results from the presentation delivered at the III International Congress in Political Philosophy 
and Theory: Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Justice, held on 06 and 07 November 2012 at the University 
of Minho, Portugal.
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Issues of international power, equilibrium, and stability overruled moral and legalistic 
approaches in the of conduct international relations, particularly during the period of 
détente.
Cold Warrior extraordinaire George Kennan (1993) best summarises the dominant 
perspective of post-war US decision-makers regarding the role of human rights in foreign 
policy by asserting a principle of non-interference in others states’ affairs. A government’s 
task is to interact with other governments whilst generating the least amount of tension 
possible between those two states. The soundest method to accomplish this, according to 
Kennan (1993: 207), is to avoid meddling in others internal affairs, for each government 
«from the standpoint of morality, [is] the judge of its own behaviour». While acknowled-
ging some utility in the human rights movement throughout the years, Kennan was ada-
mant in his disapproval of governmental human rights promotion through pressure for 
it may have been more counterproductive than useful to US national interests.
Much of the initial emphasis placed on human rights in the US’s international con-
duct flourished in the early 1970s. Wary of US involvement with repressive regimes and 
the lack of a firm moral bearing in foreign policy making, Congress put into effect a wide 
array of legislation to safeguard its concerns with human rights issues abroad. The earliest 
legislation was put forward in 1973 in a response to the reported unrestrained behaviour 
of police forces in countries such as Chile and Vietnam. The Amendment to Section 600 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 sought to prohibit the official involvement of US 
in equipping and training foreign police forces (Salzberg, 1986). The following years wit-
nessed a rise in amendments to the foreign assistance legislation, as well as an increasing 
specification of detail, with the intention of promoting an improvement in the human 
rights of other countries. 
Of particular importance was the work carried out by the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements2 chaired by Congressman Donald Fraser between 
1973 and 1978. The so called Fraser Committee adopted a report3 in 1974 that stated 
that, while the safeguarding of human rights was fundamentally a sovereign issue, «when 
a government is itself the perpetrator of the violations, the victim has no recourse but to 
seek redress from outside his national boundaries» (cited in Salzberg, 1986: 15). Human 
decency should unite individuals in a common cause to counter these abuses, for «they 
have both the opportunity and responsibility to help defend human rights throughout 
the world» (cited in Salzberg, 1986: 15). In essence, the report emphasised the need for 
the US to make human rights a common standard in its foreign policy decision-making.
Throughout the years the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Mo-
vements contributed significantly to heighten US attention to human rights in its in-
ternational dealings. For instance, in 1974 the disappointment with the results of the 
Abourezk amendment to curtail US assistance to regimes with political prisoners led the 
Subcommittee to introduce Section 502 to the Foreign Assistance Act and placed the 
2. The committee was later renamed Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations.
3. The report was titled Human Rights in a World Community: A Call for US Leadership. 
artículos originales
Da Vinha, Luis. Revisiting the Carter Administration’s Human Rights Policy102
onus on the President for the responsibility of justifying continued military assistance 
to regimes that violated human rights. The initial segment of the amendment read as 
follows:
It is the sense of Congress that except in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall 
substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, 
including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged 
detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the 
security of the person […]
Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to any government falling within 
the provisions of paragraph (a), the President shall advise the Congress of the extraordi-
nary circumstances necessitating the assistance (Committee on International Relations 
and Committee on Foreign Relations, 2003: 229).
Military assistance to repressive regimes was thus constrained unless the President 
could justify the «extraordinary circumstances». Correspondingly, in 1975 an amend-
ment was also introduced to restrict economic aid to governments responsible for gross 
violation of human rights. More specifically, Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
(a.k.a. the Harkin amendment) established that economic aid could only be provided if 
the «Administrator primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act to submit 
in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly benefit the nee-
dy people in such country, together with a de-tailed explanation of the assistance to be 
provided (including the dollar amounts of such assistance) and an explanation of how 
such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country» (Committee on 
International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations, 2003: 59).
Other areas of foreign assistance were also subject to similar constraints regarding 
the respect for human rights. For instance, the Food for Peace Act and the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank adopted the concept of 
«gross violations» of the Foreign Assistance Act to compel foreign regimes to assure basic 
human rights for their citizens (Salzberg, 1986). In addition, the International Financial 
Institutions Act (Sections 701 and 703) instituted goals and standards for human rights 
which were to guide US participation and voting in the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Fund 
(Salzberg, 1986).
The legislation mentioned so far entailed a coercive approach to human rights; i.e., 
it endorsed the interruption or termination of assistance to regimes that did not comply 
with protection of basic human rights of their populations (with the exceptions already 
mentioned). However, in 1977 the Subcommittee introduced Section 116(e) of the Fo-
reign Assistance Act which authorised the President to provide financial assistance to 
programs and activities which promoted civil and political rights in countries qualified 
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for aid.4 The majority of the assistance went to programs supporting nongovernmental 
organisations which carried out activities such as teaching, visits, information, legal ser-
vices, research, and workshops in the US and abroad (Salzberg, 1986).
In the five years of Fraser’s chairmanship, the subcommittee held over 150 hearings, 
interviewing over 500 witnesses. The effort of the committee reveals its misgivings towards 
the Nixon and Ford Administrations compliance with the human rights element of their 
foreign policy. In fact, both Administrations tried to sidestep many of the legislative 
initiatives. In 1975, for example, Kissinger decided to not release the country reports 
arguing that all states violate human rights and singling out individual countries could 
be detrimental to US interests (Merritt, 1986). 
Moreover, military and financial assistance continued to be given to controversial 
regimes such as Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Philippines, and South Korea. As a result, 
specific country legislation was adopted in order to proscribe or limit military and eco-
nomic aid. Chile and South Korea were the initial targets of the legislation, but they were 
followed in the ensuing years by countries as diverse as Argentina, Cambodia, Cuba, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, South Africa, Uganda, and Vietnam. While ack-
nowledging that for operational reasons Congress was not the best institution to manage 
foreign assistance (e.g., due to the time of response to violations or compliance of human 
rights), Fraser supported the legislation due to the difficulty in making the Adminis-
tration comply with congressional intentions (Salzberg, 1986). Also, in 1976 Congress 
overrode a presidential veto to enact a human rights policy into the International Security 
and Arms Export Control Act making legislation linking human rights and security as-
sistance a legal requirement (rather than the non-binding situation previously observed).
Moreover, the legislation submitted throughout the years led the Department of State 
to request reports on human rights from US embassies. The reports consisted of a short 
review and analysis of the human rights practices in each individual country. This practice 
began with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was followed by all the other 
regional bureaus. The initial reports were completed in 1975 and were updated yearly. 
The country-by-country reports provided an initial assessment for establishing US foreign 
assistance.
3. The Carter Administration and the Quest for a Morally Pragmatic 
Foreign Policy
The Carter Administration has been harshly criticised for its human rights policy. Disap-
proval has come from both sides of the political divide. Some on the left have condemned 
the Administration for its inconsistency and bias in enforcing human rights in repressive 
regimes. Others, mostly on the right, have assailed the Administration for its naiveté in 
trying to balance human rights concerns with issues relevant to national security. Howe-
ver, while Carter’s personal experience may have contributed initially to some excessive 
4. At that time, the budget allocated was $ 750,000 US dollars.
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idealism,5 a careful examination of the Carter Administration’s public statements and offi-
cial documents attests to the contrary. In fact, the Administration developed an intricate 
account of the concept of human rights and its infusion into US foreign policy and was 
well aware of its limits and potential inconsistencies. 
Human rights were a central concern for Carter right since his presidential campaign. 
Indeed, Carter’s campaign was centred more on values than on specific issues (Kaufman, 
1993). Confronted with the predicaments of Watergate, Vietnam, and CIA covert ope-
rations in the Third World, Carter was very critical of the secrecy and realpolitik involved 
in past Administration’s foreign policy. He thus put emphasis on human rights as one of 
the ways by which the US could improve its global image (Moore, 1984). Accordingly, 
in his second presidential debate with Ford, Carter (1976) chastised the previous admi-
nistrations for ignoring human rights and consequently weakening America’s position in 
the world. In his closing statement, he argued that the US should once again become «a 
beacon for nations who search for peace and who search for freedom, who search for in-
dividual liberty, who search for basic human rights» (Carter, 1976). The theme of human 
rights continued to be a significant discussion point throughout the campaign.
Once in the White House the Administration promptly began working to conceptua-
lise its human rights perspective and embed it within the Administrations’ broader foreign 
policy goals and objectives. Contrary to past Administrations, with Carter «human rights 
rhetoric was given unprecedented prominence in US foreign policy» (Mutua, 2007: 568). 
In the briefing book submitted by Brzezinski to Carter, on April 30, outlining the top 
ten foreign policy goals for the following four years, human rights featured prominently 
in countering soviet ideological expansion and enhancing the global sensitivity to the 
US’s adherence to international norms (Brzezinski, 1983). From the beginning, despite 
their consensus on the issue (Carter, 1982), key decision-makers in the Administration 
were aware of the limits of institutionalising human rights in foreign policy. Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance was particularly sensitive to the implications of pursuing a human 
rights agenda. While agreeing on the need for a more moral approach to foreign policy, 
from the opening Vance (1983) counselled Carter on the need to maintain flexibility and 
pragmatism in dealing with particular cases that might affect US security interests – e.g., 
South Korea. In order to reconcile human rights with other issues of national interest and 
develop a coherent and functional foreign policy, the Administration set up the Intera-
gency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.
Meanwhile, key-members of the Administration were beginning to showcase the fra-
mework of the future policy. A preliminary outline of the Carter Administration’s human 
rights policy was presented by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher (1977), in 
a statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, on March 7, 1977. 
Whilst confirming the Administration’s commitment to human rights as an integral part 
of its foreign policy, Christopher (1983) acknowledged that at many times there would 
be difficult trade-offs:
5. In his memoirs, Carter (1982: 44) admits that he initially did «not fully grasp all the ramifications of our policy». 
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[...] conflicts in policy may arise when the security of the United States is linked to that 
of a country whose human rights priorities are deficient. It should be uppermost in our 
minds that security assistance is rendered to maintain or enhance our own security, not 
to strengthen the hand of a repressive regime, although we must face up to that as an 
undesired and unintended consequence in certain cases (Christopher, 1983: 408).
The best way to balance this reality was, according to Christopher, to carefully and 
systematically weigh human rights concerns against economic and security goals on a 
country-by-country basis. In each case a series of questions was developed in order to 
help decision-makers settle on the best policy option, namely (Christopher, 1983: 408):
•	 Will our action be useful in promoting the cause of human rights? Will it actually 
improve the human rights situation at hand? Or, is it likely to make it worse?
•	 What will be the most effective means of expressing our views? Quiet diplomacy? A 
public pronouncement? Withdrawal of aid or other tangible sanctions?
•	 Even when there is only a remote chance that our action will be influential, does our 
sense of values, our American ethic, prompt us to speak out or take action?
•	 Will others support us? Can we expect the aid of national and international organiza-
tions dedicated to furthering human rights?
•	 Have we steered away from the self-righteous and strident, remembering that our own 
record is not unblemished?
•	 Finally, have we remembered national security interests and kept our sense of perspec-
tive, realizing that human rights cannot flourish in a world impoverished be economic 
decline or ravaged by armed conflict?
Secretary of State Vance reiterated this position in his May 23 speech at the Law Day 
ceremonies at the University of Georgia. While proclaiming human rights as an essential 
part of the US’s progressive values, Vance held firm on the limits of US power and its 
wisdom. Therefore, Vance called for a realistic policy which took into consideration the 
effective possibility of achieving US objectives. Any other attitude would result in «a sure 
formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values 
on others» (Vance, 1977: 506). Thus, elaborating on Christopher’s previous statement to 
Senate, Vance also put forward a series of questions that the Government must consider 
before deciding on what action to take.6
On the previous day (May 22, 1977), Carter laid out his vision for human rights in an 
address at Notre Dame University. Carter reaffirmed his conviction that previous admi-
nistrations had backed away from traditional US values in their dealings with other na-
tions due to the excessive focus on containing the global expansion of soviet communism. 
6. The questions put forward by Vance are in general quite similar to those presented by Christopher.  However, 
Vance (1977) added some initial considerations on the nature of the case, i.e., «What kinds of violations or depri-
vations are there? What is their extent? Is there a pattern to the violations? If so, is the trend toward concern for 
human rights or away from it?»
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However, according to Carter (1977), far-reaching changes were occurring globally and 
«as more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined 
to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice». Consequently, US policy should 
reflect its historical optimism in the belief that «dignity and freedom are fundamental 
spiritual requirements» of all individuals and peoples (Carter, 1977). While committing 
human rights as a fundamental tenet of US foreign policy, Carter was careful to highlight 
that there were no «rigid moral maxims» to guide policy and that changes in the human 
rights conditions in many nations could be protracted. Rather than any guarantee to rid 
the world of the plethora of violations to human rights, Carter was sober in his pledge:
Throughout the world today, in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there 
is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights. And I believe it 
is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that debate, that contention 
alive (Carter, 1977).
Thus, the US could be counted on to serve as a sounding platform for those indivi-
duals and people who lacked the basic rights from their governments. By acknowledging 
the limits in enforcing human rights abroad and that change would be slow in many 
cases, Carter merely committed the US to keep the human rights agenda on the table. 
Ultimately, it was a question of political moralisation, as he later admitted in his memoir:
Whenever I met with the leader of a government which had been accused of wronging its 
own people, the subject of human rights was near the top of my agenda. Almost always, 
the discussion was initiated by those who had been accused. They seemed eager to let me 
know what progress was being made in their homeland to end persecution and to redress 
grievances. I knew often that this was a ploy to mislead me, but even then it was possible 
that the seeds of reform had been planted. At least they were confronting a question they had 
not been forced to address before (Carter, 1982: 150-151; emphasis added).
In July 1977 the final draft of the Presidential Review Memorandum on Human 
Rights7 (hereafter PRM 28) was submitted to the Administration. Adopting the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its conceptual foundation, PRM 28 
identified three main groups of human rights (Christopher, 1977):
•	 The right to be free from governmental violations of personal integrity, namely torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, denial of 
fair public trial, and invasion of the home;
7. Presidential Review Memorandums identified topics to be researched by the NSC, defined the problem to be 
analyzed, set a deadline for the completion of the study, and assigned responsibility for it to one of the two NSC 
committees. When the committee completed the study the conclusions were sent to the President and formed the 
basis for a Presidential Directive.
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•	 Economic and social rights, which imply that governments did not restrain an indivi-
duals freedom to fulfil his vital needs (e.g., food, shelter, health care, education) or fail 
satisfactorily to support individuals in meeting these needs;
•	 Civil and political rights, guaranteeing freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of 
speech, of the press, as well as individuals’ freedom of movement within and outside 
his own country and the freedom to partake in government.
The authors of PRM 28 highlight that the Administration’s human rights policy 
should, in accordance with the President and Secretary of State, contemplate all three 
groups of rights. However, the study does highlight the differences involved in safeguar-
ding these different groups of rights and analyses the costs and benefits involved in each 
group. The document also acknowledges that there is no single strategy for approaching 
the issue. Rather, PRM 28 argues for a case-by-case evaluation within the context of 
national groupings. Accordingly, the study identifies Western Democracies, Communist 
States, Third World Nations, and Gross Violator of Human Rights. Each grouping has 
particular characteristics that recommend certain types of actions, such as:
•	 Diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts;
•	 Changes in levels of security and economic assistance and food aid;
•	 Initiatives in international financial institutions;
•	 Use of overseas broadcast facilities and cultural programs;
•	 Improved access to the US for refugees and dissidents;
•	 Substantive and procedural initiatives in various international forums.
Taking into consideration the issues analysed in PRM 28 and other discussions, in 
February 1978, Carter issued the Presidential Directive on Human Rights (hereafter 
PD 30) stating that «[i]t shall be a major objective of US foreign policy to promote the 
observance of human rights throughout the world» (Carter, 1978: 1). Nevertheless, in 
accordance, with the previously mentioned public statements and documents, the direc-
tive did observe the need for «due consideration to the cultural, political, and historical 
characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental US interests with respect to the 
nation in question» (Carter, 1978: 1). In this sense, PD 30 called for a comprehensive 
approach to human rights, while maintaining a pragmatic perspective in conducting US 
foreign policy.
The record of the Carter Administration’s performance on human rights confirms this 
elaborate perspective. Domestically, the Administration surpassed some important ins-
titutional hurdles and was able to press the Senate to ratify several international human 
rights conventions, i.e., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the American Convention on Human 
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Rights, and the International Genocide Convention. Although unsuccessful in obtaining 
their endorsement in the Senate,8 the Administration kept pushing key-politicians behind 
the scenes to adopt the conventions throughout its tenure (Glad, 2009).
Internationally, the Carter Administration was able to link aid to human rights issues, 
but as Apodaca and Stohl’s (1999) research demonstrates, economic aid was also subject 
to other considerations such as economic requirements, past assistance record, and tradi-
tional national interests. Moreover, in relation to military aid, the same study reveals that 
while assistance was cut to Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay other countries with similar negative human rights records con-
tinued to receive aid (e.g., Indonesia, and El Salvador and Guatemala in the final year of 
the presidency). Other policies revealed similar dynamics. For instance, while the Admi-
nistration was quite vocal on Soviet abuses on human rights, it concurrently normalised 
relations with China without pressing any such concerns. Regarding the peace process 
in the Middle East, after the initial demands for the recognition of the autonomy of the 
Palestinian people, the Administration gradually conformed to the reality on the ground 
and acquiesced to Israeli policies.
In the end, Carter’s human rights policy had its consequences. While it certainly was 
a source of pride and achievement for many of the top decision-makers, it was also a 
cause for frustration in particular circumstances. Brzezinski confirms this paradox in his 
memoir. He states that, in general, the Administration’s policy «can be counted a success» 
(Brzezinski, 1983: 129) and proudly lists the number of political prisoners released due 
to its global endeavours9. This sense of fulfilment however was lacking when assessing the 
Shah’s fall from power. While maintaining that «Carter’s efforts to make the Shah more 
responsive to human rights was a step in the right direction», Brzezinski (1983: 397) 
acknowledged that «it came at a time when the basic problems of Iran were beginning to 
get out of hand and the structure of authority was beginning to crack». Similar dilemmas 
were also to be faced by every proceeding Administration.
4. US Human Rights Policy after the Carter Administration
Throughout its tenure and afterwards, the Carter Administration’s foreign policy was fier-
cely assailed by political opponents. Its human rights policy was particularly beleaguered. 
Jeane Kirkpatrick epitomised the feeling in conservative circles. In her renowned essay 
Dictatorships and Double Standards, Kirkpatrick (1979: 42) condemned Carter for being 
«par excellence, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism, chan-
ge with progress, optimism with virtue». Her most disparaging critique focused on the 
Carter Administration’s inability to discriminate between different types of authoritarian 
8. During Carter´s term in office, none of these treaties were ratified by the Senate. In the following years only the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and the International Genocide Convention were approved by the Senate.
9. Brzezinski presents the following number of political prisoners releases between 1977 and 1980 due to US pres-
sure: 300 in Peru; 35000 in Indonesia; reduction of thousands of «disappearances» in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil.
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regimes in its human rights policy. Fixing specifically on Iran and Nicaragua, Kirkpatrick 
accused Carter of weakening the already fragile regimes (allies of the US) in favour of 
revolutionary forces antagonistic to US interests: 
The foreign policy of the Carter administration fails not for lack of good intentions but 
for lack of realism about the nature of traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and 
the relation of each to the American national interest. Only intellectual fashion and the 
tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the 
facts that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary auto-
cracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible 
with US interests (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 44).
The Reagan Administration came to office expecting to amend the Carter 
Administration’s emphasis on human rights. More precisely, the Reagan Administration 
sought to return US foreign policy to more geopolitical and geostrategically oriented 
policies (Forsythe, 1990). However, the Administration quickly encountered difficulties 
in trying to abandon the active promotion of the human rights agenda. One of the first 
challenges came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which rejected the nomi-
nation of Ernest Lefever as head of the Bureau of Human Rights10 (Jacoby, 1986). 
The opposition to the planned policy led to a change in the Reagan Administration’s 
discourse on human rights. Accordingly, once staunch critics of the previous Administra-
tions human rights policy, Reagan and his cabinet began indulging in a more moralistic 
rhetoric and argumentation. For instance, the once outspoken detractor on human rights 
policy, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, found himself having to assert that «human 
rights were ‘the major focus’ of the administration’s foreign policy» (cited in Mertus, 
2004: 29). Likewise, Kirkpatrick (1981), now US Ambassador to the UN, argued in a 
symposium in late 1981 that «not only should human rights play a central role in U.S. 
foreign policy», but also that «no US foreign policy can possibly succeed that does not 
accord them a central role». 
However, despite the newly acquired rhetoric on human rights promotion, and some 
progress, particularly in bilateral relations, the Reagan Administration continued to sup-
port and aid regimes with weak human rights records. One reason for this was that the 
definition of human rights used by the Reagan Administration differed notably from its 
predecessor. Rather than the previous three broad groups of human rights, the Reagan 
Administration «harmonized the definition [of human rights] to be consistent with ove-
rall foreign policy by eliminating the economic rights category» (Drezner, 2000: 745). 
Human rights policy narrowed its focus entirely to civil and political rights. Coupled with 
a renewed prominence placed on the national interest, this allowed for the Administration 
to continue and even augment aid to friendly (i.e., rightist) authoritarian regimes such as 
10. Lefever was a declared opponent of human rights legislation and publicly supported abandoning the practice of 
developing annual country reports on human rights practices (Mertus, 2004).
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El Salvador, Liberia, South Korea, and Zaire. Human rights served an essentiality ideo-
logical rationale, namely as a tool for promoting anticommunist policies throughout the 
Third World. Accordingly, human rights considerations were frequently invoked to justify 
aid to opposition groups such as the Contras in Nicaragua, Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, 
and UNITA in Angola (Mertus, 2004). Although it is true that the Administration did 
espouse a harder line with some friendly regimes (e.g., Chile, Philippines, and Paraguay), 
especially in its second term, this resulted more from a shift in strategic thinking rather 
than a genuine concern for human rights issues (Forsythe, 1995).
It is a fact that, unlike Carter, Reagan never wanted to transform international rela-
tions, namely through the encouragement of greater global governance. Yet, as Forsythe 
(1995) has appropriately pointed out, by the end of his term, Reagan’s human rights 
policy revealed many resemblances with Carter’s. 
Each sought to advance human rights inconsistently, where major security and economic 
interests did not interfere. Each largely ignored some major human rights problems. 
Congress had forced Carter’s hand on Idi Amin’s Uganda, and Reagan’s hand on South 
Africa, both via economic sanctions. Congress pushed Carter further than he wanted to 
go regarding introducing human rights considerations into World Bank proceedings, 
and it pushed Reagan further than he wanted to go regarding human rights violations by 
friendly forces in Central America (Forsythe, 1995: 123).
George H W Bush came to power confident the US could hail in a «new world order» 
in which US values could multiply throughout the globe. Addressing a joint session of 
Congress, Bush proposed a new world where
[...] the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize 
the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the 
rights of the weak (Bush, 1990).
However, despite the appearance of a noble purpose, Bush held fast to his predeces-
sors’ legacy of pursuing a human rights policy that was repeatedly subject to matters of 
tangible national interest. In reality, the Administration did secure the ratification of the 
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1992) and used international institutions 
such as the United Nations Organization and Organization of American States11 to pro-
mote human rights issues abroad. In addition, while revealing a less moralistic tone than 
Carter and Reagan, the Bush Administration took a tough stance on several human rights 
issues, namely protesting against the discrimination of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and 
pressuring the government of El Salvador to put an end to death squads and other hu-
manitarian violations (Pastor, 2001). Moreover, the US committed itself to safeguarding 
11. Namely by supporting the Santiago Declaration which states that an attack on a democratic government in the 
hemisphere is an international issue and, accordingly, requires a regional response.
Revista de Paz y Conflictos
issn 1988-7221 | Nº 7 | 2014 | pp. 99-122 111
the rights of people in harsh predicaments by sending troops to Somalia in late 1992 and 
assuring the creation of a Kurdish zone of autonomy in Iraq in 1991 (Mertus, 2004). 
However, it is difficult to identify a consistent pattern of human rights promotion for 
the Bush Administration. Albeit the merit of the initiatives mentioned above, the Admi-
nistration revealed that human rights concerns were lessened when there was a conflict of 
interests. More precisely, after Desert Storm there was no pressure for democratic reforms 
in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and assistance to Shiite and Kurdish minorities only com-
menced after intense media coverage (Mertus, 2004). Cutbacks in assistance to friendly 
dictators (e.g., Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Siad Barre of Somalia, and Mobutu Sese Seko 
of Zaire) were opposed by the Administration and situations of extreme humanitarian 
despair were ignored (e.g., Mozambique). Regardless of public condemnation of Chinese 
actions in Tiananmen Square, the Bush Administration also renewed Chinas’ most favou-
red nation status shortly afterwards. Furthermore, the Administration accompanied the 
approval of international treaties with a host of RUDs (Reservations, Understandings, 
and Declarations) which certified that the US would «abide by only those provisions 
compatible with the American constitution and that are in conformity with existing 
American law» (Mertus, 2004: 32).
Accordingly, The Bush Administration would promote human rights only when they 
did not conflict with American geopolitical and geostrategic considerations. But this did 
not make the Administration exceptional in any way. As Forsythe (1995: 126) reminds 
us «His [Bush] record on international human rights was similar to his predecessors in 
terms of its inconsistency… but different in terms of lack of lofty rhetoric». In fact, the 
lack of a more vocal stance of human rights opened the way for attacks from the Clinton 
campaign. In accusing Bush of contriving with human rights violators, Clinton stated 
he would do more to aid Russia’s transition to democracy and take a tougher attitude 
towards China’s human rights violations (Chollet and Goldgeier, 2008). He also assailed 
Bush for turning his back on Haitian refugees and ignoring the atrocities in Bosnia (Apo-
daca, 2005). In contrast, Clinton vowed to be unwavering in upholding human rights 
values even when facing competing interests (Mertus, 2004). This outlook was consistent 
with the renewed optimism in the improvement of human rights that followed the demi-
se of the Cold War (Mammadov, 2011).
Under the banner of «democratic enlargement», the Clinton Administration commit-
ted itself to promoting free market-style democracy. More precisely, the Administration’s 
new strategy focused on strengthening the community of market economies, promoting 
new market democracies, countering aggression to liberal democracies, and assisting the 
implementation of market democracies in the regions of greatest humanitarian concern 
(Brinkley, 1997). The fundamental rationale was that economic liberalisation would con-
tribute to greater political freedom and, concurrently, that the implementation of the rule 
of law and the safeguard of basic freedoms would sustain a robust economy. As a result 
of this vision «human rights issues were brought into discussions of trade and economic 
relations as never before» (Mertus, 2004: 37).
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In order to carry out the new strategy several bureaucratic innovations were imple-
mented. The Center for Democracy and Governance was created, the National Security 
Council received a special assistant for democracy, and the Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs bureau was renamed the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
(Mertus, 2004).
However, Clinton’s democratic enlargement was constrained by geoeconomic consi-
derations. As the Administration’s National Security Strategy (The White House, 1995) 
pointed out, promotion of democracy and increasing respect for fundamental human 
rights would be sought where it was possible. Therefore, according to Brinkley, certain 
regions were privileged targets of the new policy:
[...] as a politically viable concept, enlargement had to be aimed at primary US strategic 
and economic interests. For example, Asians in general took a vastly different view of what 
constituted democracy, preferring to emphasize social order over individual rights. Under 
enlargement, America’s chief concern in Asia would therefore be free market access - the 
rest, for the most part, would be left to sort itself out (Brinkley, 1997: 116).
If anything, Clinton contributed to keeping human rights at the head of the inter-
national agenda (Walt, 2000). In the United Nations Organisation (UN) the Admi-
nistration led the way for a broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
narrowing the concept of state sovereignty, and also enlarged the concept of UN peace-
keeping interventions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, reigning-in a second genera-
tion of international missions (Mertus, 2004). Furthermore, the Clinton Administration 
catalysed the institutionalization of international criminal courts for dealing with the 
crimes committed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.12
Strong rhetoric also helped to persuade the ruling junta in Haiti to step down and 
restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti in 1994. It also blocked an International 
Monetary Fund loan to Croatia on the grounds of its failure to protect minority rights 
and prosecute war criminals (Mertus, 2004). More noticeably, the Clinton Adminis-
tration was credited with leading in a new era of humanitarian interventions – i.e., the 
promotion, namely by military force, of  human rights and other humanitarian concerns 
in situations void of any tangible US interest (a.k.a., Clinton Doctrine) (Walt, 2000). US 
interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Somalia seem to confirm that the Adminis-
tration was «willing to use force to change the internal governance and conditions within 
other countries even when security interests were minimal» (Dietrich, 2006: 276).
However, as former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labour of the Clinton Administration, Harold Koh (2002: 330), has clarified, the pro-
motion of democracy and human rights were a means to achieving goals of national 
interest; more precisely «the goal of American foreign policy is thus to fuse power and 
12. However, the Clinton Administration contested the creation of the International Criminal Court.
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principle, by promoting the globalization of freedom as the antidote to other global pro-
blems, resorting to force in those rare circumstances where all else fails».
The same pretence holds true for foreign assistance. While official rhetoric on demo-
cracy and human rights was soaring, government expenditures significantly lagged behind 
other foreign policy issues. An illustrative case in point is the contrast in 1999 between 
the Department of Defences’ appropriation of over $276 billion and the $21.6 billion at-
tributed to International Affairs (Mertus, 2004). In addition, the foreign aid provided by 
the Clinton Administration did not contribute significantly to improvements in human 
rights in the beneficiary countries. In their study on the impact of US foreign assistance, 
Apodaca and Stohl (1999) found that, contrary to the three previous Administrations, 
human rights issues did not influence a country’s odds of receiving economic assistance 
from the Clinton Administration.  In the end, the research revealed that «Clinton is more 
concerned with shoring up US economic interests by maintaining and expanding overseas 
markets than with human rights issues» (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999: 194).
The renewal of Chinas’ most favoured nation status clearly attests to this fact. Although 
the US maintained a strong rhetoric towards issues such as the forced labour of prisoners, 
the denial of religious freedom, and the occupation of Tibet, it also proceeded to delink 
these issues from economic considerations. Looking to bring China into the liberal ins-
titutional order, the Clinton Administration repeatedly overlooked human rights viola-
tions and augmented bilateral economic relations and supported Chinas integration in 
various international organizations (Apodaca, 2005; The White House, 1995). Also, in 
light of the Asian economic crisis, the US pressed international financial institutions to 
augment funding significantly to Asian countries regardless of considerations regarding 
human rights, labour rights, or environmental protection (Mertus, 2004). In sum, the 
Clinton Administration was more vocal on human rights than the preceding Republican 
administrations, but this rhetoric was generally not backed by its foreign policy decisions. 
According to Mertus (2004: 47), three policy areas were particularly prone to this dis-
crepancy: «in bilateral strategies against countries that are human rights abusers, in the 
indiscriminate proliferation of US arms sales abroad, and in the erratic positions taken 
toward multilateralism and the ICC».
The George W. Bush Administration fared no better than its predecessor when it came 
to reconciling human rights and other issues of national interest. Bush (2000) came to 
office on the promise of a more «humble» foreign policy and criticised Clinton’s humani-
tarian missions, specifically claiming that «I don’t think our troops ought to be used for 
what’s called nation-building». In fact, Bush avoided referring to human rights before the 
events of September 11th 2001. Unwarranted pressure on human rights promotion was 
initially seen as unproductive in certain circumstances. For instance, when considering 
relations with China, Condoleezza Rice (2000: 55) cautioned that «[a]lthough some 
argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes 
precisely those who are most likely to change the system».
However, September 11th placed human rights once again at the forefront of political 
considerations. As Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Lor-
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ne Craner (2001), remarked shortly after the attacks, rather than abandon its focus on 
human rights issues September 11th confirmed that «maintaining the focus on human 
rights and democracy worldwide is an integral part of our response to the attack and is 
even more essential today than before September 11th». However, Craner also alerted to 
a change in human rights policy brought on by the event:
Our policy in this Administration, and it is certainly true after September 11, is to focus 
on US national interests. […] Our focus on national interests will come by concentration 
on advancing human rights and democracy in countries important to the United States. 
[…] A third characteristic of our democracy policy will be a willingness to take on tough 
jobs, long term projects in countries and regions that today appear inhospitable to human 
rights and democracy (Craner, 2001).
In the same vein, the 2002 National Security Strategy materialised this conviction into 
official policy. Committing itself to «champion aspirations for human dignity»,13 the new 
strategy stated that «America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human 
dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of 
worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for 
private property» (The White House, 2002: 3). While the National Security Strategy did 
refer to the promotion of human rights in several passages, there was no effort to define 
them (as opposed to «dignity»). In this sense, as Mertus (2004) has pointed out, the Na-
tional Security Strategy neglects mostly every non-derogable human right consecrated by 
international treaties, such as the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be free from slavery or 
servitude, and the right to be free from retroactive application of penal laws.
Just as for the previous government, the Bush Administration also considered eco-
nomic liberalisation as a vital instrument for improving human rights. According to the 
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice (2000: 50), «the growth of entrepreneurial 
classes throughout the world is an asset in the promotion of human rights and individual 
liberty». As the prior Administration, Bush and his colleagues boasted «faith in the power 
of markets and economic freedom to drive political change» (Rice, 2000: 57). This eco-
nomic certainty was combined with a fervour for democracy promotion abroad.
The high ideals put forwarded by Bush clashed however with the Administration’s 
actions. In fact, as Koh (2005) has observed, the «Bush Doctrine places the United States 
in the position of promoting genuine double standards, one for itself and another for the 
rest of the world». Throughout its term in office the Administration’s unilateralist conduct 
has given way to an extensive redefinition of human rights issues, particularly on the do-
mestic front – e.g., homeland security, law enforcement, immigration control, detention, 
governmental secrecy, and information access. More precisely, US policy under Bush has 
13. In fact, Bush used the expression «dignity» on many occasions, allowing him to move away from the use of the 
term «human rights» (Mertus, 2004).
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led some critics to caution to the «imbalance of powers» which has on many occasions put 
the Government «at odds with core American and international human rights principles» 
(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2003: 3).
On the international front the Bush Administration also revealed large contradictions. 
The rhetoric on democracy and human rights has not coincided with policy. For instance, 
Congress with strong presidential support, approved the American Service-Members’ 
Protection Act in 2001 which prohibited the US from collaborating with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and created a presidential right to protect US citizens and service 
members from being prosecuted by the court (Forsythe, 2006). 
Especially alarming was the abuse of prisoner at US-run prisons, such as Abu Ghraib, 
Bagram, and Guantanamo. After the invasion of Iraq it became public that high US 
officials had allowed cruel interrogation procedures to be carried out in several detainee 
centres. Moreover, the Administration tried to justify that the terrorists captured were 
exempt form the legal protections for prisoners established in several international treaties 
(e.g., Geneva Conventions, UN Convention against torture and degrading treatment). 
In effect, in 2006, President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act14 which sanctio-
ned the use of coerced testimony and evidence on US citizens and non-citizens obtained 
through cruel, inhuman, and demeaning treatment if found reliable by military judges 
(i.e., if they were designated «unlawful enemy combatants»). What’s more, while main-
taining a strong rhetoric on human rights abroad, the Bush Administration maintained 
and consolidated US relations with illiberal regimes such as China, Kuwait, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan, further deteriorating the US’s international legitimacy and 
reputation for competence (Power, 2008).
The election of Barak Obama did not break the trend in US human rights policy 
initiated with the Carter Administration despite the clamour for change. While initially 
more restrained in declaring the promotion of democracy and human rights, the Obama 
Administration has also revealed incongruence between its rhetoric and policy (Carothers, 
2012; Mammadov, 2011). Trying to distance himself from Bush, in his initial address to 
the UN General Assembly, Obama (2009a) admitted «that America has too often been 
selective in its promotion of democracy» and that it «cannot be imposed on any nation 
from the outside». Nevertheless, in the same address Obama did acknowledge universal 
principles and self-evident truths. In accepting the Nobel Peace Prize he once again rei-
terated that the US would always lend its voice to universal aspirations (Obama, 2009b). 
But as Nau has pointed out, the Obama Administration’s pragmatic pursuit for security 
has led him to overlook several regimes’ infringement of human rights policies:
[Obama] did not pledge specific help for dissidents in Burma, Zimbabwe, Iran, and 
elsewhere. And in none of these speeches did he mention, let alone confront, the oppres-
sive policies of a new wave of authoritarian powers stalking the world –Russia in Europe, 
China in Asia, Iran in the Middle East, and Venezuela in Latin America. Instead he turned 
14.  The Act was eventually amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009.
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to many of these new autocrats as principal partners to pursue shared global interests of 
disarmament, economic recovery, climate change, and non-proliferation (Nau, 2010: 31).
In fact, the Administration has come under heavy fire for its lack of commitment to 
human rights (Carothers, 2012; Mammadov, 2011; Myers, 2012). In a devastating op-ed 
in the New York Times, Jimmy Carter assailed the Obama Administration (as well as the 
Bush Administration) for abandoning the US’s role of global champion of human rights. 
According to Carter (2012) «our country can no longer speak with moral authority on 
these critical issues». 
The Obama Administration has tackled a number of human rights concerns. It closed 
many of the CIA black sites known for forced disappearances and mistreatment, invalida-
ted several of the predecessor administrations’ legal memos on enemy prisoners, banned 
the majority of the enhanced interrogation techniques previously in effect, rejoined the 
UN Human Rights Council, and re-established a working relationship with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Carothers, 2012; Forsythe, 2012).
Some of the issues that have raised contention have been: the Administration’s unwi-
llingness to press China on Human Rights; refusal to meet with the Dalai Lama; cutbacks 
in funding of the Agency for International Development; accommodation to Central 
Asian regimes (e.g., Tajikistan); failure to close the prison in Guantanamo; targeted drone 
killings; continued administrative detention without legal charge or trial; maintenance 
of military commissions; opposing prosecutions of past tortures and creation of truth 
commissions on past detainee abuse; boycott of the Durban II meetings; belittling of the 
Goldstone Report15 (Forsythe, 2012; Lewis, 2012; Nossel, 2012; Roth, 2010). 
Accordingly, the Obama Administration’s human rights policy does not drastically 
depart from previous Administrations, «[s]elf interest in security and economic advanta-
ge loomed large, as expected by powerful domestic constituents» (Forsythe, 2012: 785). 
The second term most likely will not prefigure any significant reconsideration of the 
Administration’s earlier policies. The need to steer US foreign policy in a period in which 
global power in the international system is in flux will certainly constrain US human 
rights policy in the coming years.
5. Final Thoughts and Considerations
The Carter Administration placed human rights at the forefront of US foreign policy. As 
Mertus (2004: 27) has recognised «never before had an American presidency endorsed 
such a broad list of rights». Confronted with the deteriorating international standing of 
the US, Carter sought to imbue American policy with a new élan by promoting human 
rights as a central pillar of his foreign policy. More than just allude to its support for a 
collection of vague ideals, the Administration developed an elaborate and far reaching 
conceptualisation of human rights.
15. The name commonly attributed to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.
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Nevertheless, the interagency debate highlighted the limits to applying an unrestricted 
policy of human rights promotion. In particular, the Carter Administration was aware of 
the complexity involved in balancing the multiple factors conditioning the national inter-
est. Savvy to the complexities involved in implementing and maintaining a coherent hu-
man rights policy, Vance (1983: 436) recognised that «no mechanistic formula will pro-
duce an automatic answer». As a result, Carter’s Presidential Directive on Human Rights 
required that human rights issues be analysed within the particular national contexts and 
in relation to other US interests. Accordingly, PD 30 sought to pursue a comprehensive 
outlook to human rights, while maintaining a pragmatic approach to conducting US 
foreign policy. As a result, the Administration’s human rights policy ultimately failed to 
live up to its initial promise. Rhetorical appeals for safeguarding and promoting human 
rights would intermingle with the endorsement and support of despotic regimes.
Similar challenges would confront ensuing Administrations. While the Reagan Admi-
nistration sought to amend the Carter’s emphasis on human rights, it eventually embra-
ced human rights as part of its roll-back strategy. In fact, Reagan employed human rights 
as an ideological rationale for promoting anticommunist policies in the Third World and 
concurrently increasing aid to friendly authoritarian regimes and local opposition groups. 
Subjecting human rights considerations to other more tangible matters of the national 
interest was continued by George H W Bush. While proclaiming the emergence of a new 
world order in which human rights would be a central tenet, the Bush Administration 
placed greater effort in trying to manage the demise of the Cold War international or-
der. In following a realist conception of international relations, Bush promoted human 
rights only when they were not in conflict with American geopolitical and geostrategic 
considerations.
The Clinton Administration associated human rights promotion with the dissemina-
tion of free market-style democracies. Whereas Clinton contributed to keeping human 
rights at the forefront of the international agenda, foreign policy was essentially determi-
ned by geoeconomic considerations. Accordingly, certain countries and regions of interest 
to the US were exempted from human rights considerations in their dealings with Ameri-
ca, particularly regarding financial and military aid, while others in which gross violation 
of human rights were committed were eschewed due to their political and economic irre-
levance. The George W Bush Administration continued the pattern of inconsistency in 
promoting human rights. The attacks of September 11th placed human rights once again 
at the forefront of political rhetoric, but the Administration’s actions at home and abroad 
raised serious reservations. In particular, the Bush Administration used the war on terror 
to justify a redefinition of human rights issues on the domestic front. Issues pertaining 
to homeland security, law enforcement, immigration control, detention, governmental 
secrecy, and information access put into question many of the American citizens’ basic 
rights. Internationally the Bush Administration further tarnished the US human rights 
record by sanctioning cruel interrogation procedures and strengthening American rela-
tions with several illiberal regimes. While making change a fundamental issue on his road 
to the Presidency, President Obama has avoided any effective commitment to human 
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rights. Rhetoric apart, Obama has revealed himself a pragmatist and therefore avoided 
any excessive emphasis on promoting the liberal agenda on human rights.
Several different approaches to human rights in US foreign policy have been idealised 
in the multiple Administrations – e.g., realism, enlightenment cosmopolitanism, provi-
dential nationalism. However, as Forsythe (2012: 767) has so clearly pointed out, «all 
administrations wind up exercising inconsistent policy choices regarding human rights 
in foreign policy». All the American Administrations since Carter have revealed a similar 
pattern of «muddling through» on human rights and foreign policy because they have 
been unable to strike a successful balance between security and economic interests and 
human rights. This difficulty derives from the fact that material interests continue to sco-
re high on the political agenda. Also, the plethora of international and domestic actors 
which Administrations much engage with further complicates political considerations.
The Carter Administration was well aware of these contradictions. Despite the fact 
that many sources are today still classified, available research indicates that few Adminis-
trations have reflected as thoroughly and critically on the development of human rights 
in US foreign policy as the Carter Administration did. Moreover, seldom has any other 
US Administration publically expressed its policy so clearly and categorically. The Carter 
Administration never failed to highlight that there would be times in which other ele-
ments of the national interest would triumph over human rights considerations. More 
importantly, Carter (1977) was explicit in his misgivings regarding American exceptio-
nalism in international human rights policy: «We have our own shortcomings and faults, 
and we should strive constantly and with courage to make sure that we are legitimately 
proud of what we have».
An equally clear and balanced reflection is even more crucial for the US in facing 
future international challenges. The trends which have consolidated since the demise of 
the Cold War will certainly continue – i.e., rhetorical support for human rights, proactive 
policies, targeted legislation, International Treaties, and legal authority (Dietrich, 2006). 
Other trends, such as using economic liberalisation and democratisation as means of pro-
moting human rights, will also persist. Inconsistencies and contradictions will never be 
eradicated from US foreign policy-making. However, a more balanced approach between 
human rights and other aspects of the national interest can be attempted. Upholding na-
tional security and economic progress does not necessarily have to alienate the promotion 
of fundamental human rights or sanction their violation abroad or at home.
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